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Abstract—The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic
coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about
spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably
results in asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation that stems
from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between
competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This
motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued
LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the inter-
actions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic
game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously
make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-
price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions
in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user
subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive
the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions.
Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies
by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South
Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE
spectrum auction designs.
Index Terms—Network economics, spectrum auction, differen-
tial game, spite motive, regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
With the proliferation of smartphones, tablets, and ever more
data hungry applications, the demand for mobile data traffic
continues to grow dramatically. According to a Cisco report,
global mobile data traffic will increase 10-fold between 2014
and 2019 [1]. As a remedy, the numerous technology enhance-
ments of LTE (i.e., LTE-Advanced) have been proposed, yet
this technology evolution alone is not sufficient [2], [3]. The
need for additional spectrum is critical to address the explosive
data challenges successfully. However, wireless spectrum is
a scarce resource, and thus has been tightly regulated by
allocating spectrum blocks to licensed cellular operators [4].
Moreover, given spectrum allocations today, it is less likely to
exploit a contiguous bandwidth wider than 20 MHz or even
a 20MHz contiguous bandwidth [5]. These spectrum scarcity
and bandwidth fragmentation pose increasing challenges of
additional spectrum allocation, from a regulator’s perspective.
Our study is motivated by the latest LTE spectrum auction in
South Korea on the basis of the above considerations [6]. The
key issue was whether or not Korea Telecom (KT) secures 10
MHz of contiguous spectrum in the 1.8 GHz band. Because
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of KT’s current 10 MHz downlink carrier in this band, KT
could directly launch the wideband LTE services (i.e., up to
150 Mbps in the downlink) at little expense, offering faster
connections compared with the normal LTE (i.e., up to 75
Mbps in the downlink). This is because LTE Release 8/9
can support a maximum of 20 MHz of contiguous spectrum.
On the other hand, the other operators requested the KCC
to exclude KT from bidding on the contiguous spectrum
block to ensure fair competition. In order to provide the
double-speed LTE services like KT, they should deploy the
inter-band non-contiguous carrier aggregation (CA) (i.e., LTE-
Advanced services), which requires huge investments as well
as some deployment time. In light of these conflicting views,
the allocation of the new spectrum resources is not purely a
technical issue, but economic and regulatory considerations
should be taken into account as well.
Spectrum auctions have been widely used in wireless com-
munication. Most of prior works have assumed that bidders
(i.e., operators) are self-interested, i.e., they only maximize
their own profits regardless of the profits of other bidders [7]–
[12]. However, considerable mismatches between the theory of
self-interest and the outcome of the real-world auction have
been observed [13]. This can be explained by a spite motive,
which is the preference to deteriorate the profits of their
competitors [14]. In a highly competitive wireless industry, for
instance, the loss for one side may entail the corresponding
gain for the other side. Therefore, operators will intend to
maximize their own profit, as well as minimize the profits
of their competitors in the auction for improving their own
standing, which inspired our work to model and analyze the
bidding behavior of such spiteful operators.
B. Contributions of this paper
This paper studies bidding and dynamic pricing compe-
tition between two spiteful/competing operators, taking into
account user subscription dynamics. Given that asymmetric-
valued LTE spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them, we
formulate the interactions between two operators and users
as a hierarchical dynamic game framework. In the upper
level, two spiteful operators compete in a first-price sealed-
bid auction with considering their current spectrum holdings.
Different from the standard auction game in the existing
literature, each operator maximizes the weighted difference
of his own profit to that of his competitor. In the lower level,
two competing operators optimally set their dynamic pricing
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2Fig. 1. System model for spectrum auction.
strategies to maximize their long-term revenues, considering
user subscription dynamics with the newly allocated spectrum.
Unlike the traditional static game model [15], we formulate
a (noncooperative) differential game and derive a closed-
loop Nash equilibrium to capture the price dynamics and the
corresponding user subscription dynamics. Using backward
induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under
mild conditions.
The contributions of this paper are summarized follows:
• We propose a hierarchical dynamic game framework to
study bidding, dynamic pricing, and user subscription
dynamics. This framework can be used as a research tool
to analyze the impact of spectrum allocation on market
structure.
• We highlight the impact of different timing to launch
the double-speed LTE services between two operators
on price dynamics and user subscription dynamics. We
further investigate the effects of users’ net switching
costs, playing a role in a subsidy for the market share
leader, and a tax for the market share followers. Based
on this, we examine the asymmetric values of contiguous
spectrum and non-contiguous spectrum blocks.
• We study the bidding behavior of spiteful operators and
the resultant profits of them. We verify our studies by
comparing the latest results of LTE spectrum auction
in South Korea. This provides the design guidelines of
asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model and the proposed hierarchical
dynamic game framework. Sections III and IV investigate
the closed-loop Nash equilibriums taking into account user
subscription dynamics in asymmetric and symmetric phases,
respectively. Section V analyzes the spiteful bidding strate-
gies and the resultant profits. Section VI provides numerical
results to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued
LTE spectrum allocation, followed by concluding remarks in
Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider two operators, say 1 and 2, bidding for two
spectrum blocks A and B in a first-price sealed-bid auction
as shown in Fig. 1. In this auction, the two operators si-
multaneously submit their bids in closed envelopes and the
operator with the highest bid wins, and pays its bid for the
spectrum block. Note that A and B are the same amount of
downlink 10 MHz bandwidth. Without loss of generality, we
consider only the downlink throughout the paper. Note that
both operators deploy Frequency Division Duplex LTE (FDD
Fig. 2. Hierarchical dynamic game framework for bidding, pricing, and user
subscription dynamics.
LTE) and provide services to users in the same geography
area.
Due to the operators’ existing spectrum holdings, the timing
to launch the double-speed LTE services depends on the results
of the LTE spectrum auction. If A is assigned to operator
1, the double-speed LTE services1 are directly provided to
users. On the other hand, the other operator 2 who acquires B
should deploy the inter-band non-contiguous CA to exploit
fragmented spectrum, enabling to offer double-speed LTE
service to users. However, it requires some deployment time T .
For notational convenience, we assume that operator 1 acquires
A, which will be relaxed in Section V.
Since the deployment time T completely alters the nature
of the operators’ dynamic pricing strategies and the user
subscription dynamics, we analyze two phases t < T and
t ≥ T , separately, by defining the following terms.
Definition 1. (Asymmetric phase) Assume that operator 2
launches double-speed LTE service at time T . When 0 ≤ t <
T , we call this period asymmetric phase due to the different
services provided operators 1 and 2.
Definition 2. (Symmetric phase) When t ≥ T , we call this
period symmetric phase because of the same services offered
by operators 1 and 2.
B. A Hierarchical Dynamic Game Framework
We formulate the interactions between the two operators and
the users as a hierarchical dynamic game as shown in Fig. 2.
The proposed game consists of two levels: an upper-level first-
price sealed-bid auction game for bidding competition between
two spiteful operators, and a lower-level differential game for
1In fact, the peak downlink data rate for a user equipment (UE) category 3
(i.e., the existing LTE devices) is 100 Mbps, and 150 Mbps for a UE category
4 (i.e., LTE-Advanced devices). However, we assume that the double-speed
LTE services are supported to the users for analytical tractability, which does
not change the main insights obtained in this paper.
3dynamic pricing competition between them considering user
subscription dynamics.
1) Lower-level differential game: Users dynamically decide
whether to stay in their current operator or to switch to the
other operator for utility maximization. This user subscription
dynamics depends on the perceived utilities, the operators’
current prices, switching costs, and price subsidies. Given
the current operators’ market shares, the operators optimally
set their service prices (i.e., time-dependent) to maximize
their long-term revenues with the newly allocated spectrum.
We model a differential game to completely characterize the
operators’ dynamic pricing strategies and the corresponding
user subscription dynamics in two phases.
2) Upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game: Two
spiteful operators compete in a first-price sealed-bid auction
based on the estimated revenues in the lower level. Since
the realized profits are tightly coupled across the operators,
the objective of each operator is maximizing the weighted
difference of his own profit to that of his rival, where the
weight γ is the spite (or competition) coefficient that denotes
the degree of competition.
III. USER SUBSCRIPTION DYNAMICS AND DYNAMIC
PRICING COMPETITION IN ASYMMETRIC PHASE
We consider a continuum of users that subscribes to one
of the operators based on his or her operator preference. This
continuum model, a widely used model to analyze the wireless
communication industry, reflects the reality well if there are
a sufficiently large number of users so that a single user is
negligible [16], [17]. We assume that the total population is
normalized to 1. Let xi(t) denote the market share of operator
i ∈ {1, 2}, where xi(0) = x0i ∈ [0, 1] is the initial market share
of operator i. We assume full market coverage, i.e., x1(t) +
x2(t) = 1. Such assumption approximates the real world in
that global mobile-cellular penetration already stands at 96%
[18]. We also assume that operators 1 and 2 provide same
quality in communication services to the users so that they
have the same reserve utility u0 before spectrum allocation.
A. Lower-level Differential Game in Asymmetric Phase
1) User subscription dynamics model: In asymmetric
phase, the users in operators 1 and 2 obtain different utilities,
i.e.,
u1(t) = (1 + η)u0, u2(t) = u0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (1)
where η ∈ (0, 1) is a user sensitivity parameter to the double-
speed LTE service than existing one. It means that the users
care more about the data rate as η increases. The users in
operator 2 have more incentive to switch to operator 1 as η
increases. When they decide to change operator 1, however,
they face two different types of economic factors: switching
cost and price subsidy. The former that a user has to pay when
changing operators is the disutility that a user experiences,
while the latter that the operators give a subsidy to attract their
competitors’ users is the utility that a user receives. Different
users confront with different levels of switching costs and price
subsidies. To model such users’ heterogeneity, we assume that
the price subsidy ps and the switching cost cs are variables
over [0, s] and [0, s], respectively. For simplicity, we further
assume that the net switching cost s = cs− ps, the difference
between the switching cost and the price subsidy, is uniformly
distributed in [−s, s] with 0 < s ≤ s. When s → −s2, the
user has more incentive to switch to the other operator while
the converse is when s→ s.
Now let us focus on how user subscription dynamics works
in asymmetric phase. In the following analysis, we restrict our
attention to the case that the switching from one operator to
another in both directions is always possible. Since the gain
of one operator represents a loss to another operator under
the full market coverage, this assumption implies that the two
operators are competing fiercely for market share by retaining
their own users as well as stealing their rival’s users. A user
k in operator i ∈ {1, 2}, with net switching cost, sk, observes
the prices charged by operators 1 and 2 (p1(t) and p2(t)). A
user k in operator i will switch to operator j 6= i if
uj(t)− pj(t)− sk > ui(t)− pi(t). (2)
Thus the mass of switching users from operator i to j is
qij(t) = P[sk < uj(t)− ui(t)− pj(t) + pi(t)]. (3)
Note that the mass of staying users in operator i qii(t) =
1− qij(t).
Assuming that p1(t) − p2(t) ∈ [ηu0 − s, ηu0 + s] so that
q21(t) and q12(t) belong to (0, 1), the net change in operator
i’s market share in the infinitesimal time interval (t, t+dt], the
difference between the mass of switching users from operator
j to i and the mass of switching users from operator i to j,
can be expressed as follows:
xi(t+ dt)− xi(t) = qji(t)xj(t)dt− qijxi(t)dt. (4)
Then each operator’s market share rate at time t over [0, T ) is
x˙1(t) =
ηu0− p1(t) + p2(t) + s
s1
− 2s
s1
x1(t),
x˙2(t) = −ηu0− p1(t) + p2(t) + s
s1
+
2s
s1
(1−x2(t)), (5)
where s1 = s+ s. Note that the rates x˙1(t) and x˙2(t) are
functions of the current service prices p1(t) and p2(t), the
current market shares x1(t) and x2(t), the user sensitivity
parameter η, and the minimum (or maximum) of users’ net
switching costs s (or s).
2) Operators’ pricing model: Given the user subscription
dynamics (5), operators 1 and 2 simultaneously determine their
prices (p1(t), p2(t)) so that their total revenues are maximized
over [0, T ).
Similarly, each operator’s revenue rate at time t in asym-
metric phase can be written as follows:
ri(t) = pi(t)(xi(t) + x˙i(t)), i ∈ {1, 2}. (6)
Here, the revenue rate is the sum of revenue from current users
and revenue gain/loss from new/old users.
2This is reasonable because, according to [19], SK Telecom, Korea’s largest
telecom, gave the users who purchased Samsung Galaxy S4s an extra 100
dollars, making it a ’minus phone’.
4For each operator i ∈ {1, 2}, the optimal pricing control
problem over a finite-time horizon [0, T ) can be expressed as
follows:
P1 : max
pi(t)
RAPi (p1(t), p2(t)) =
∫ T
0
e−ρtri(t)dt, (7)
s.t. x˙1(t) =
ηu0−p1(t)+p2(t)+s
s1
− 2s
s1
x1(t), (8)
x1(0) = x
0
1, (9)
where ρ is the discount rate taking into account the time
value of money, and x01 is the initial market share of operator
1. Since x˙2(t) = −x˙1(t) and x2(0) = 1−x1(0) given the
assumption of full market coverage, we can describe the user
subscription dynamics constraints by only (8) and (9). Note
that each operator’s pricing strategy depends on not only the
competitor’s pricing strategy but also, the market share state
(i.e., the market shares of the two operators) that evolves
according to a user subscription dynamic constraint in (8). This
allows us to formulate and analyze the optimization problem
P1 within the differential fame framework [20].
3) Formulation of Differential Game: Now we formulate
the dynamic pricing competition between the two operators as
a finite-horizon differential game as follows.
• Players: two operators 1 and 2.
• Strategy space: operator 1 can choose price p1(t) from
the continuous and bounded set P1 = [0, (1+η)u0] while
operator 2 can choose price p2(t) from P2 = [0, u0]. This
is due to the assumption x1(t)+x2(t) = 1 so that all
users are served.
• Market share state: the market shares of the two operators
constitute the market share state denoted by a vector
x(t) = [x1(t), x2(t)]
T , where the state is controlled by
the user subscription dynamics constraint in (8).
• Payoff function: two operators want to maximize their
total discounted revenues over a prespecified time horizon
in (7), respectively.
B. Closed-loop Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Phase
For the formulated finite-horizon differential game, we will
investigate the two operators’ dynamic pricing competition and
the corresponding user subscription dynamics. To understand
the two operator’s dynamic pricing strategies in the differential
games literature, we first want to point out two main types
of strategies: open-loop strategies and closed-loop strategies.
The open-loop strategies do not involve strategic interaction
between the two operators through the evolution of the market
share state over time and the corresponding adjustment in
their prices. This means that the two operators announce their
pricing strategies at the initial time and commit to them,
regardless of how the market share state x(t) evolves. In this
regard, the open-loop strategies are neither time-consistent nor
subgame-perfect in general. On the other hand, the closed-
loop strategies take into account the initial and current market
share state, allowing the two operators to determine and adjust
their pricing strategies as x(t) changes. Thus, we consider the
closed-loop strategies to capture the price dynamics and the
corresponding user subscription dynamics.
With the notion of closed-loop strategies, the (subgame-
perfect) closed-loop Nash equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Closed-loop Nash equilibrium). A pair of
closed-loop strategies (p∗1, p
∗
2) ∈ P1×P2 is called a closed-
loop Nash equilibrium if the following holds:
RAPi (p∗i (·), p∗j (·)) ≥ RAPi (pi(·), p∗j (·)),
for all pi ∈ Pi, and for any initial market share xi(0) = x0i ∈
[0, 1], i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
At a closed-loop Nash equilibrium, no operator can increase its
revenue by changing its strategy unilaterally, given the current
pricing strategy of the other operator.
To obtain the closed-loop Nash equilibrium and the resultant
user subscription dynamics, we need to first examine the
necessary conditions by applying the Pontryagin maximum
principle [21]. To this end, we introduce the Hamiltonian
function for operator i defined as:
Hi(t) = ri(t)+λi(t)x˙1(t), i = {1, 2}, (10)
where λi(t) is the co-state variable of operator i associated
with the market share x1(t). For simplicity, we will drop
the time dependence expression t from all variables, unless
specified otherwise.
Since the Hamiltonian function for operator i is strictly
concave in the price pi, the necessary conditions for the
closed-loop Nash equilibrium provide sufficient conditions for
optimality, i.e.,
x˙1 =
ηu0−p1+p2+s
s1
− 2s
s1
x1, x1(0)=x
0
1, (11)
∂Hi
∂pi
= 0, (12)
∂λi
∂t
= ρλi− ∂Hi
∂x1
− ∂Hi
∂pj
∂pj
∂x1
, (13)
λi(T ) = 0. (14)
Note that (12) is the maximum condition with respect to the
strategy of operator i, (13) is the adjoint equation to describe
the dynamics of the co-state variable, and (14) is the boundary
condition for the terminal time of the co-state variable. We
further note that the term ∂Hi∂pj
∂pj
∂x1
in (13) affects how the
two operators adjust their prices as x(t) evolves over time.
By solving the above conditions, we can obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Let
p∗1(t, x
∗
1(t))=
ηu0+s+2s−e1(t)−z(t)
3
+
s2−k(t)
3
x∗1(t), (15)
p∗2(t, x
∗
1(t))=
−ηu0+2s+s+e2(t)−z(t)
3
− s2−k(t)
3
x∗1(t), (16)
x∗1(t)=e
∫ t
0 δ(ξ)dξ
(
x01+
∫ t
0
e−
∫ τ
0 δ(ξ)dξζ(τ)dτ
)
, x∗2(t)=1−x∗1(t),
(17)
where
λ1(t)=k(t)x
∗
1(t)+e1(t), λ2(t)=k(t)x
∗
2(t)+e2(t)
k(t)=
α1
(
1−e
2(α1−α2)
3s1
(T−t)
)
1− α1
α2
e
2(α1−α2)
3s1
(T−t)
, µ(t)=
13s+5s+6k(t)
9s1
+ρ,
5z(t)=
2s2
3(1+ρ)
(
1−e(1+ρ)(t−T )
)
, ζ(t)=
ηu0+2a+b+e1(t)+e2(t)
3s1
,
e1(t)=−e
∫ t
0 µ(ξ)dξ
(∫ T
t
e−
∫ τ
0 µ(ξ)dξν(τ)dτ
)
, e2(t)=e1(t)−z(t),
δ(t)=
2(k(t)−b−2a)
3s1
, ν(t)=
(
2s2+3k(t)
) (
z(t)−2s−s−ηu0
)
9s1
,
and α1 and α2 are the solutions of the quadratic equation
2
3s1
k(t)2−
(
11s+25s+9s1ρ)
9s1
)
k(t)+ 29s2=0. Then, (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) con-
stitute a closed-loop Nash equilibrium and (x∗1, x
∗
2) are the
corresponding user subscription dynamics of the problem P1.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
IV. USER SUBSCRIPTION DYNAMICS AND DYNAMIC
PRICING COMPETITION IN SYMMETRIC PHASE
In the previous section, we have studied the dynamic pricing
competition of the two operators and the corresponding user
subscription dynamics in asymmetric phase. In this section,
we consider them in symmetric phase by formulating an
infinite-horizon differential game. The analysis is similar to
the previous section and thus this section is brief.
A. Lower-level Differential Game in Symmetric Phase
1) User subscription dynamics model: Since operator 2
launches double-speed LTE service in symmetric phase, we
assume that the users in operators 1 and 2 obtain same utility,
i.e.,
u1(t)=u2(t)=(1+η)u0, t>T. (18)
Similar to the analysis in Sec. III-A, assuming that p1(t)−
p2(t)∈[−a, a] so that q21(t) and q12(t) belong to (0, 1), each
operator’s market share rate at time t over [T,∞) is
x˙1(t)=
p2(t)−p1(t)+s
s1
− 2s
s1
x1(t)=−x˙2(t). (19)
2) Operators’ pricing model: Given the user subscription
dynamics (19), each operator’s revenue rate at time t in
symmetric phase can be written as follows:
ri(t)=pi(t)(xi(t)+x˙i(t)), i∈{1, 2}. (20)
For each operator i∈{1, 2}, the optimal pricing control prob-
lem over an infinite-time horizon [T,∞) can be expressed as
follows.
P2: max
pi(t)
RSPi (p1(t), p2(t))=
∫ ∞
T
e−ρtri(t)dt, (21)
s.t.x˙1(t)=
p2(t)−p1(t)+s
s1
− 2s
s1
x1(t), (22)
x1(T )=x
T
1 , (23)
where xT1 is the initial market share of operator 1 from the
end of asymmetric phase.
3) Formulation of differential game: The dynamic pricing
competition between the two operators can be formulated as
an infinite-horizon differential game as follows.
• Players: two operators 1 and 2.
• Strategy space: operator i can choose price pi(t) from the
continuous and bounded set Pi=[0, (1+η)u0] for i=1, 2.
• Market share state: the market share state x(t)=
[x1(t), x2(t)]
T is controlled by the user subscription
dynamics constraint in (19).
• Payoff function: the two operators want to maximize their
total discounted revenues over a prespecified time horizon
in (21), respectively.
B. Closed-loop Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Phase
To proceed with the analytical solution of the formulated
infinite-horizon differential game, we now focus on the closed-
loop Nash equilibrium solutions and the consequent user sub-
scription dynamics of the problem P2. Recall that at a closed-
loop Nash equilibrium, no operator has an incentive to deviate
from its strategy after considering the other operator’s strategy.
The closed-loop Nash equilibrium and the consequent user
subscription dynamics are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let
p∗1(t, x
∗
1(t))=
s1+s+e2−2e1
3
+
s2−k
3
x∗1(t), (24)
p∗2(t, x
∗
1(t))=
s1+s+2e2−e1
3
− s2−k
3
x∗1(t), (25)
x∗1(t)=
1
2
+
(
xT1 − 1
2
)
e
2(k−s−s1)
3s1
(t−T )
, x∗2(t)=1−x∗1(t), (26)
where k is the smallest root of the quadratic equation
6k2−(11s+25s+9ρs1) k+2s22=0,
and
e1=
s2
3(1+ρ)
+
s22−3k(2s+s)
6k−13s−5s−9ρs1 , e2=e1−
2s2
3(1+ρ)
.
Then, (p∗1, p
∗
2) constitute a closed-loop Nash equilibrium and
(x∗1, x
∗
2) are the corresponding user subscription dynamics of
the problem P2.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
V. BIDDING COMPETITION
In the upper level, the two spiteful operators compete
in a first-price sealed-bid auction where asymmetric-valued
spectrum blocks A and B are auctioned off to them. For fair
competition, each operator is constrained to lease only one
spectrum block (i.e., A or B). We assume that the regulators
set the reserve prices cA and cB to A and B, respectively. Note
that reserve price is the minimum price to get the spectrum
block. Since A is the high-valued spectrum block, we further
assume that the two spiteful operators are only competing on
A to provide double-speed LTE service to their users earlier.
Based on the projected total revenues of the two operators
in the lower level, operators 1 and 2 bid A independently
as b1 and b2, respectively. In this case, B is assigned to the
6operator who loses in the auction as the reserve price cB . Since
this operator should make huge investments to double the
existing LTE network capacity compared to the other MNO,
we also assume the only operator who acquires B incurs the
investment cost cBS .
For notational convenience, we have assumed that operator
1 procures A throughout the paper. Without loss of generality,
however, we can relax this assumption easily after some
algebraic manipulations. The projected aggregate revenues of
the two operators over the entire time-horizon [0,∞] can be
expressed as follows:
• Assuming that operators 1 and 2 acquire A and B
respectively, each operator’s projected aggregate revenue
during the entire period is
RA1 =RAP1 +RSP1 , RB2 =RAP2 +RSP2 , (27)
where RAPi and RSPi are described in (7) and (21),
respectively, for i=1, 2.
• Assuming that operators 1 and 2 procure B and A
respectively, each operator’s projected aggregate revenue
during the entire period is
RB1 =RAP
′
1 +RSP
′
1 , RA2 =RAP
′
2 +RSP
′
2 , (28)
where RAP ′i and RSP
′
i for i=1, 2 can be obtained by
reformulating the problems P1 and P2, and following
the same steps as in Appendices A and B. Details are
omitted for brevity.
When asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are allocated to
the operators, there is a trade-off between self-interest and
spite. To illustrate this trade-off, we first restrict ourselves
to the case where the spite is not present. If operator i is
self-interested, his objective function is as follows:
Πi(bi, bj) =
[
RAi −bi
]
·Ibi≥bj+piBi ·Ibi≤bj , i= 1, 2, i 6= j, (29)
where I is the indicator function and piBi =RBi −cB−cBS is
the profit from B for i= 1, 2. This is the standard auction
framework in that operator i maximizes his own profit without
considering the profit of his competitor.
In the real world, however, there are observations that
some operators are completely malicious [13]. If operator i is
completely malicious, his objective function can be changed
as follows:
Πi(bi, bj) =−piBj ·Ibi≥bj−
[
RAj −bj
]
·Ibi≤bj , i= 1, 2, i 6= j, (30)
It means that operator i only intends to minimize the profit of
operator j.
Departing from the standard auction framework, our model
incorporates this strategic concern in that each spiteful opera-
tor cares about maximizing the weighted difference of his own
profit to that of his competitor. Combining (29) and (30), we
define each operator’s objective function as follows.
Definition 4. Assume that two spiteful operators (i.e., i= 1, 2
and i 6= j) compete in a first-price sealed-bid auction. The
objective function that each operator tries to maximize is given
by:
Πi(bi, bj) =
[
(1−γ)(RAi −bi)−γpiBj
]
·Ibi≥bj
+
[
(1−γ)piBi −γ
(
RAj −bj
)]
·Ibi≤bj , (31)
where I is the indicator function, piBi =RBi −cB−cBS is the
profit from B, and γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter called the spite
(or competition) coefficient.
Note that (31) will be used to determine the bidding
strategies of two spiteful operators, which does not affect the
realized profits of the two operators. As described, operator i
is self-interested and only intends to maximize his own profit
when γ= 0. When γ= 1, operator i is completely malicious
and only tries to minimize the profit of his competitor. For
given γ ∈ [0, 1]3, we can derive the optimal bidding strategies
that maximize the objective function in Definition 4 as follows.
Proposition 3. In a first-price sealed-bid auction, the equilib-
rium bidding strategies for two operators 1 and 2 are given
by
b∗1(γ) =
(1−γ)(RA1 +cA−piB1 )+γ(RA2 −piB2 )
2−γ ,
b∗2(γ) =
(1−γ)(RA2 +cA−piB2 )+γ(RA1 −piB1 )
2−γ . (32)
Proof. See Appendix C. 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, several numerical results are presented
to investigate the impact of spectrum allocation on market
structure, and provide insights into the role of the regulator.
For illustration convenience, we assume that operators 1 and
2 acquire the spectrum blocks A and B, respectively, unless
otherwise specified.
A. Dynamics of Pricing Competition and User Subscription
We first study the impact of spectrum allocation on the
two operators’ dynamic pricing strategies and the the resultant
user subscription dynamics. As a benchmark, we focus on
the symmetric market share before spectrum allocation where
the initial market state of the two operators are chosen as
x(0) = [0.5, 0.5].
Fig. 3 shows the two operators’ equilibrium pricing strate-
gies and the corresponding user subscription dynamics under
different deployment times. In asymmetric phase (t<T ), due
to the earlier launch of double-speed LTE service, we see that
operator 1 becomes the market share leader while charging
a higher price. An interesting observation is that p∗1(t) and
x∗1(t) increase in t, while the reverse is true for operator
2. These phenomena are due to the presence of the users’
net switching costs. As t increases, the more users with the
3If two operators are asymmetrically spiteful, γ can be different for two
operators.
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Fig. 3. The dynamics of user subscription and the two operators’ pricing
strategies. Other parameters are u0 =10, η=0.5, ρ=0.5, s=5, and s=10.
high net switching costs are locked in, allowing operator 1 to
optimally raise p∗1(t) by the amount of the net switching costs
with the increase in x∗1(t). This forces operator 2 to reduce
p∗2(t) but with the decrease in x
∗
2(t). The users’ net switching
costs, thus, can be interpreted as a subsidy for operator 1 and
a tax for operator 2. It is also worth pointing out that the
longer deployment time T is the slower rate of increase of
p∗1(t) for operator 1, while the faster rate of decrease of p
∗
2(t)
for operator 2 at the lower initial prices p∗1(0) and p
∗
2(0). With
the longer T , operator 1 has more to gain by charging p∗1(t)
less aggressively and attaining x∗1(t) more aggressively for the
same t, thereby maximizing the aggregated revenue RAP1 (T )
over [0, T ). On the other hand, operator 2 tries to maximize
RAP2 (T ) by decreasing p∗2(t) more aggressively, but losing
more x∗2(t) for the same t.
In symmetric phase (t≥T ), due to the same services offered
by the two operators 1 and 2, each operator faces a trade-off
between a low price to increase its market share, and a high
price to harvest its revenue by exploiting users’ net switching
costs. As shown in Fig. 3, the large operator 1 charges a high
price while the small operator 2 charges a low price. Thus, the
asymmetries of their market shares and prices fade away over
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Fig. 4. Revenue gain as a function of T under different parameters x(0)
and η. Other parameters are u0 =10, ρ=0.5, s=5, and s=10.
time, resulting in symmetric outcomes in steady state. We also
observe that the slower rate of the steady state as T increases.
B. Values of Contiguous and Non-contiguous Spectrum
In this subsection, we examine the values of two different
spectrum blocks: contiguous spectrum block A and non-
contiguous spectrum block B. To this end, we define the
revenue gain as follows:
Rgain = R
A
i
RBj
, i= 1, 2, i 6= j. (33)
Fig. 4 shows how Rgain changes in T with different pa-
rameters η and x(0). Intuitively, the revenue gain is strictly
increasing over T and this gain becomes much higher as
η or x01 increase. It explains how critical new spectrum is
allocated to both operators, and why they should spitefully
bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction to achieve a dominant
position or compensate the revenue gap. It also indicates that
the asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation should be
carefully tailored to avoid excessive competition, and promote
fair competition between operators.
C. Bidding Strategies and Resultant Profits
Based on the estimated values of two different spectrum
blocks, we investigate the two operators’ equilibrium bidding
strategies and their corresponding profits. To this end, the
initial market share state are set to x(0) = [0.6, 0.4]. Fig. 5
shows how the two operator’s equilibrium bidding strategies
realize when the spite coefficient γ varies under two differ-
ent deployment times. Intuitively, the more spiteful the two
operators are, the more aggressively they tend to bid. Since
more spiteful operator gets more disutility from the profit of
his competitor, he is willing to sacrifice some monetary payoff
in order to minimize his rival’s profit. It is worth noting that
there is a cross-over point at γ= 0.5. This can be interpreted as
the different levels of the utility (or disutility) of winning (or
losing) the auction between the two operators. When γ < 0.5,
the more emphasis they put on their own profits, inducing
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of γ under two different deployment times. Other parameters are u0 =10,
η=0.5, ρ=0.5, s=5, s=10, cA=0.1, cB =0.2, and cBS =1.
operator 1 to place a higher bid because he could make more
profit from A. When γ > 0.5, on the other hand, they are
more interested in minimizing the profits of their competitors,
prompting operator 2 to bid more aggressively since she could
reduce operator 1’s profit more when acquiring A, and thus
increase her relative position in the market. This may explains
why Korea Telecom (i.e., a small operator) placed a bid twice
as high as SK Telecom (i.e., a large operator) for procuring
the contiguous spectrum block [6]. We also observe that the
equilibrium bidding strategies of the two operator increase as
T increases. It implies that the longer T promotes the more
fierce competition between operators.
Fig. 6 shows the resultant profits of the two operators as
a function of γ under two different deployment times. When
γ < 0.5, the two operators are more interested in maximizing
their profits, resulting in the large difference between their
profits as T increases or γ decreases. It implies that the small
operator 2 should place a more spiteful bid as T increases in
order to improve (or maintain) his own standing in a highly
competitive market. When γ > 0.5, the difference between
their profits decreases as T decreases for the same γ, allowing
operator 2 to increase his relative position in the market
by bidding more aggressively. However, when γ= 0.6 and
T = 1.5, the profit of operator 2 is is more than 35% compared
with that of operator 1. It offers meaningful insights into
the role of the regulators in that the longer T hinders fair
competition between the two operators. Thus, the regulators
should appropriately impose limits on the timing of the double-
speed LTE services. In South Korea, for example, Korea
Telecom (KT) who secured the contiguous spectrum could not
start its double-speed LTE services in major cities until March
2014, and nation-wide coverage until July [6]. This gave
its competitors time to roll out the LTE-Advanced services,
allowing to promote fair competition between operators.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a comprehensive analytical and numer-
ical studies of the effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum
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allocation. We model the interactions between operators and
users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two
spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition
decisions in the upper-level first-price seals-bid auction game,
and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differen-
tial game, taking into account user subscription dynamics.
Using backward induction, we derive and characterize the
equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through
analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by
comparing the latest results of LTE spectrum auction in South
Korea. This serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued
LTE spectrum allocation.
The weakness of this study is the same spite between two
operators. Depending on the relative position in the market,
operators may take the profits of them into account differently.
This broader setting where operators are asymmetric spiteful
makes our studies more applicable for extensive spectrum
allocation scenarios and gives more insights into the role of
regulation.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
From (12), we have the two operators’ best response func-
tions,
p1=
1
2
(p2+ηu0+s−λ1+sx1) , p2= 1
2
(p1−ηu0+s+λ2−s2x1] .
(34)
9Using them gives equilibrium prices,
p1 =
1
3
(ηu0+s1+s−2λ1+λ2+s2x1) ,
p2=
1
3
(−ηu0+s1+s−λ1+2λ2−s2x1) . (35)
Next, from (13) and (35), we obtain the following partial
differential equations,
λ˙1= ρλ1− 2p1s2−λ1(5s+s)
3s1
, λ˙2= ρλ2−−2p2s2−λ2(5s+s)
3s1
.
(36)
We solve this system of differential equations by the method
of undetermined coefficients. Assume that λi(t) = ki(t)x1(t)+
ei(t) for i= 1, 2. Substitution into (36) yields
k˙1x1+k1x˙1+e˙1= ρ (k1x1+e1)− 2p1s2−(k1x1+e1)(5s+s)
3s1
,
(37)
k˙2x1+k2x˙1+e˙2= ρ (k2x1+e2)−−2p2s2−(k2x1+e2)(5s+s)
3s1
,
(38)
where x˙1 is given in (8). Since the equalities in (37) and (38)
must hold for all values of x1, the coefficients of x1 and the
constant terms have to be zero. Define y(t) = k1(t)−k2(t) and
z(t) = e1(t)−e2(t). Subtracting (38) from (37) yields
y˙−
(
k1+k2+7s+5s+3ρs1
3s1
)
y=0, z˙−(1+ρ)z+2s2
3
=0.
(39)
Using the integrating factor method under the boundary condi-
tions λi(T ) = 0 for i= 1, 2, which implies ki(T ) = ei(T ) = 0
for i= 1, 2, we obtain
y(t)= 0, z(t)=
2s2
3(1+ρ)
(
1−e(1+ρ)(t−T )
)
, (40)
which follows that k1(t) = k2(t) and e1(t) = e2(t)+z(t).
With the above results, setting k(t) = k1(t) = k2(t) and
rewriting (37) and (38) give
k˙=− 2
3s1
k2+
(
11s+25s+9ρs1)
9s1
)
k− 2
9
s2, (41)
e˙1=
(
13s+5s+6k
9s1
+ρ
)
e1− (2s2+3k)(s1+s+ηu0−z)
9s1
. (42)
First, consider the Riccati differential equation (41). Let α1
and α2 are the two solutions of the quadratic equation, i.e.,
2
3s1
k2−
(
11s+25s+9ρs1
9s1
)
k+
2
9
s2=0. (43)
Without loss of generality, assume α1<α2. Note that the two
solutions α1 and α2 are particular solutions of (41). Then a
general solution of (41) is (see [21])
k(t)−α1
k(t)−α2 =Ce
− 2(α1−α2)
3s1
t
, (44)
where C is the constant of integration. Using the boundary
condition k(T ) = 0, the constant C is α1α2 e
2(α1−α2)
3s1
T , which
yields
k(t)=
α1
(
1−e
2(α1−α2)
3s1
(T−t)
)
1− α1
α2
e
2(α1−α2)
3s1
(T−t)
. (45)
Next, consider the first order partial differential
equation (42). Let µ(t) = 13s+5s+6k(t)9s1 +ρ and
ν(t) =
(2s2+3k(t))(z(t)−2s−s−ηu0)
9s1
. Using the integrating
factor method under the boundary conditions ei(T ) = 0 for
i= 1, 2, we have
e1(t)=−e
∫ t
0 µ(ξ)dξ
(∫ T
t
e−
∫ τ
0 µ(ξ)dξν(τ)dτ
)
, e2(t)= e1(t)−z(t),
(46)
Then the equilibrium prices can be rewritten as
p∗1(t, x1(t))=
ηu0+s+2s−e1(t)−z(t)
3
+
s2−k(t)
3
x1(t), (47)
p∗2(t, x1(t))=
−ηu0+2s+s+e2(t)−z(t)
3
− s2−k(t)
3
x1(t). (48)
Now, operator 1’s market share rate in (8) can be expressed
as
x˙1=
ηu0+2s+s+e1+e2
3s1
+
2(k−s−2s)
3s1
x1, (49)
where his initial market share is x01. Using the integrating
factor method yield
x∗1(t)= e
∫ t
0 δ(ξ)dξ
(
x01+
∫ t
0
e−
∫ τ
0 δ(ξ)dξζ(τ)dτ
)
, (50)
where δ(t) = 2(k(t)−b−2a)3(a+b) and ζ(t) =
ηu0+2a+b+e1(t)+e2(t)
3(a+b) ,
which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We proceed by following the similar steps as in Appendix
A. The Hamiltonian function for operator i is
Hi =
(
ri(t)+λi(t)x˙1(t)
)
, i= {1, 2}, (51)
Due to the concavity of Hamiltonian function with respect to
pi, the necessary conditions for the feedback Nash equilibrium
provide sufficient conditions for optimality, i.e.,
x˙1 =
p2−p1+s
s1
− 2s
s1
x1, x1(T ) =x
T
1 , (52)
∂Hi
∂pi
= 0, (53)
∂λi
∂t
= ρλi− ∂Hi
∂x1
− ∂Hi
∂pj
∂pj
∂x1
, (54)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλi(t) = 0. (55)
Note that the terminal condition in (55) is different from (14).
From (53), the equilibrium prices are
p1=
1
3
(s1+s−2λ1+λ2+s2x1) , p2= 1
3
(s1+s−λ1+2λ2−s2x1) .
(56)
From (54) and (56), we have
λ˙1= ρλ1− 2p1s2−λ1(5s+s)
3s1
, λ˙2= ρλ2−−2p2s2−λ2(5s+s)
3s1
.
(57)
We solve this system of differential equations by the method
of undetermined coefficients. Assume that λi(t) = kix1(t)+ei
for i= 1, 2. Note that the coefficients of x1(t) and the constant
terms are not functions of time when the time horizon is
infinite. Substitution into (47) yields
k1x˙1= ρ(k1x1+e1)− 2p1s2−(k1x1+e1)(5s+s)
3s1
, (58)
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k2x˙1= ρ(k2x1+e2)+
2p1s2+(k2x1+e2)(5s+s)
3s1
. (59)
Subtracting (59) from (58), as in the proof of Proposition 1,
we can show that
k1 = k2 =
11s+25s+9ρs1−
√
(11s+25s+9ρs1)
2−48(s2)2
12
,
e1= e2+
2s2
3(1+ρ)
. (60)
where k1 (or k2) is the smallest root of the quadratic equation
6k2−(11s+25s+9ρs1) k+2s22 = 0.
Let k= k1 = k2. Using (58), (59), and (60) we have
e1=
s2
3(1+ρ)
+
s22−3k(2s+s)
6k−13s−5s−9ρs1 , k=−e1−e2. (61)
Then, the equilibrium prices can be rewritten as
p∗1(t, x1(t))=
s1+s+e2−2e1
3
+
s2−k
3
x1(t), (62)
p∗2(t, x1(t))=
s1+s+2e2−e1
3
− s2−k
3
x1(t). (63)
Following similar steps in (49) and (50), user subscription
dynamics in symmetric phase can be written as
x∗1(t)=
1
2
+
(
xT1 − 1
2
)
e
2(k−s−s1)
3s1
(t−T )
, x∗2(t)= 1−x∗1(t), (64)
which completes the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Without loss of generality, suppose that operator i knows
his bid bi. Further, we assume that operator i infer that the
bidding strategy of operator j on A is drawn uniformly and
independently from [cA,RAj ]. The operator i’s optimization
problem is to choose bi to maximize the expectation of
Ebi(Πi) =
∫ bi
cA
[
(1−γ)(RAi −bi)−γpiBj
]
f(bj)dbj
+
∫ RAj
bi
[
(1−γ)piBi −γ
(
RAj −bj
)]
f(bj)dbj .(65)
Differentiating (65) with respect to bi, setting the result to zero
and multiplying by RAj −cA give
∂Ebi(Πi)
∂bi
=(1−γ)
(
RAi +cA−piBi
)
+γ
(
RAj −piBj
)
−(2−γ)bi=0.
(66)
Applying the same way to operator j completes the proof.
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